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Experimenting on Human Subiects
William E. May

The problems surrounding "free
and informed consent" are discussed in this article by Dr. May,
who is Professor of Religion in
the Department of Religion and
Religious Education at the Catholic University of America.
In May, 1973, a special CBS
Report entitled "The Ultimate
Experimental Animal: Man" was
broadcast. One scene from this
televised report struck me as particularly illuminating, and it will
serve to introduce the question of
experimentation on human beings. A black woman who had
been a prisoner in a Detroit jail
had, while in prison, participated
in a program testing a new type
of birth control pill. This particular pill was known to the researchers to carry a high risk for causing
cancer, but this fact was not made
known to the women who had
"volunteered" to participate in
the program testing its effectiveness as a contraceptive. When the
woman learned, after her release
from prison, that the pill she and
other women had been taking did
in fact pose a serious risk of causing cancer, she was outraged at
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having been "used," declaring to
the CBS correspondent that she
had been treated like an "animal."
Her reaction, I believe, is quite
instructive. In saying that she
had been treated like an animal
and in being outraged at having
been so treated, she voiced a conviction that human beings ought
not to be treated like animals.
She was not necessarily denying
that she - and other human beings also - was an animal (for
after all we are); rather she was
affirming that a human being is
an animal with a difference, that
a human being is a subject of
rights that ought to be respected
by the society in which he lives
and that demand protection by
that society. She was, moreover,
affirming that any experiment
performed on the "human animal" must, if it is to be rightfully
carried out, respect the fact that
human beings are beings of moral
worth, subjects of rights rooted
in their being and not conferred
upon them by others. She was
affirming, at least implicitly, the
conviction that no human being
can be regarded simply as a part
Linacre Quarterly

subordinated to a greater whole,
t he society in which he or · she
lives, but must be considered as a
whole that cannot rightfully be
subordinated to the interests of
others.
This, I believe, is the cardinal
point to be kept as we consider
the ethics of experimentations involving human subjects. The
moral worth of every human being is indeed the crucial truth at
stake in considering this important topic; it is the reason why
there is operative a primary "canon of loyalty," as Paul Ramsey
terms it, namely the principle of
free and informed consent, in all
situations wherein one human being is the experimenter and the
other his "co-adventurer" in the
experiment. I
There are many different kinds
of experimental situations, and
t he meaning of the principle of
free and informed consent relates
to the type of experimental situation. From our perspective, we
can broadly distinguish between
experiments that will be or are
intended to be of direct medical
value or benefit to the subject of
the experiment and those that are
not so intended. Among the first
can be included experimentations
whose purpose is to diagnose an
illness from which a person is suffering, experi mentations whose
purpose is to alleviate or cure a
malady from which the subject is
sufferin g, and experimentations
whose purpose is to prevent a person from becoming afflicted with
a specifiable malady. Thus we
November, 1974

can include among our first type
of experimentations all procedures that are intended to be of
benefit to the subject himself,
whether these be diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive. Among the
second type of experimentations
are those whose purpose is to
further human knowledge and to
benefit others by reason of the
knowledge that is obtained. The
second type of experimentations,
thus, includes procedures whose
purpose is to further biomedical
and behavioral research, to advance the frontiers of human
knowledge and thus enable men
to develop new techniques for
coping with the diverse maladies
that afflict mankind, and to enhance the human good. Although
it is quite true that persons who
serve as subjects of such experiments may themselves be benefited in a spiritual or psychological manner, in such experiments
the purpose is neither to diagnose
an illness (physical or mental)
from which they are suffering nor
to cure them of such an illness
nor to prevent them from being
a fflicted by a malady to which
they are vulnerable as members
of a subject population. There
are, in addition , experimentations
of a "borderline" character, inasmuch as they are intended both
to adva nce knowledge and thereby to benefit persons other than
the subject of the experimentat ion and also to be of benefit to
t.he subject. These experimentations might be t ermed experimentally therapeutic/ diagnostic/
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preventive. But from the perspective of the moral issues involved
- and these center on the principle of free and informed consent
- the experimentally therapeutic/ diagnostic/ preventive type of
experiment is to be considered
along with the first broad type of
experiment, inasmuch as there is
reasonable hope that the experiment will be of direct medical
benefit to the subject himself.
Thus for our purposes we can distinguish two general types of experimental situations. The first,
which for simplicity's sake can
be called diagnostic/ therapeutic
or simply therapeutic, embraces
all experiments that are ordered
toward the good health and life
of the subject, whereas the second
embraces all experimentation on a
human subject that is carried out,
as Henry K. Beecher puts it, "not
for his benefit but for that, at
least in theory, of patients in general."2
The Heart of Medical Ethics
The canon of loyalty that must
be observed in all experimental
situations is, as noted already, the
principle of "free and informed
consent." This principle is at the
heart of all medical ethics. It has
been articulated most eloquently
in the articles of the Nuremberg
Code (1946-1949), and it is instructive to remember that this
Code was formulated at a time
when the memory of the atrocities
carried out by the Third Reich
was fresh in the minds of men.
According to the first article of
the Nuremberg Code,
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the voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the person involved
sh ould have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to
be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of
any element of force , fraud , deceit,
duress, over· reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient
knowledge and comprehension of
the elements of the subject matter
involved as to enable him to make
an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance
of an affirmative decision by the
experimental s ubject there should
be made known to him the nature,
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by
which it is to be conducted ; all the
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his h ealth or person
which may possibly come from his
participation in the experiments)

This concern that a human being who is to be the subject of an
experiment give his free and informed consent is reflected also in
the codes adopted by the World
Health Organization' in the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964,4 by
the American Medical Association in its 1966 convention,; and
in the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals"
set forth in 1955 and revised in
1971. 6 It is a principle at the
heart of traditional Jewish and
Christian medical ethics, a principle reasserted time and time
again by the magisterium of the
Roman Catholic Church .?
Many, among them Henry K.
Beecher, one of the leading auLinacre Quarterly

thorities on the subject of experimentation on human subjects,
have noted that it is extremely
difficult if not impossible to secure a "fully" free and informed
consent. 8 They have observed
that frequently it is not possible
to explain to the person who will
undergo an experiment all of the
factors involved. At times the
hazards that may be present are
unknown; at other times the persons who are to be the experimental subjects may not be capable of grasping all of the pertinent factors; at other times, a
disclosure of all possible hazards
might so frighten a person that he
may not be willing to submit to a
procedure that really is not overly fraught with risks and that
really does offer very reasonable
hopes of being beneficial. It is for
these and other reasons that the
American Medical Association, in
commenting on the need for a free
and informed consent, saw fit to
add that "in exceptional circumstances and to the extent that disclosure of information concerning
the nature of the drug or experimental procedure or risks would
be expected to materially affect
the health of the patient and
,would be detrimental to his best
interests, such information ma y
be withheld from the patient.""
What this means is that the requirement or canon of loyalty
demanding a free and informed
consent must be understood as
demanding "reasonably" free and
"adequately" informed consentand the reasonableness and adeNovember, 1974

quacy are to be determined as a
prudent person would determine
them. As Paul Ramsey puts it,
"a choice may be free and respon sible despite the fact that it began
in an emotional bias one way or
another, and consent can be informed without being encyclopedic."I DIndeed, as Beecher notes
repeatedly, the very fact that a
person who is sick goes to a physician is itself an indication that he
is giving his reasonably free and
informed consent to the physician's efforts to discover what is
troubling him and to cure or alleviate the pathology from which
he is suffering. II
The requirement for a reasonably free and adequately informed consent is essential in all
types of human experimentation.
And the reason for this requirement has been simply and eloquently stated by Ramsey: "no
man is good enough to experiment.
upon another without his consent." ll To experiment on a human being without securing his
consent is to make of him a being
who is no longer a being of moral
worth; it is to subordinate him
to other humans; it is to repudiate his humanity .
Consent When the Subject
Is 'Incapable'
There are instances, however,
and these are by no means rare,
when it is impossible to obtain an
adequately informed and reasonably free consent from the person
who is himself to be the subject
of the experiment. What can be
done, or better, what ought to be
241

done, in such instances, when the
subject is incapable, whether by
reason of age, mental infirmity,
or physical condition, to give consen t in his own behalf?
There is no serious debate
among authorities, whether medical, legal, or moral, in instances
when the experiment in question
is designed to secure some benefit
for the person who is to be its
subject. This is true whether the
experiment is diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive. In cases of
this sort consent to the experiment can be given by others (parents, guardians, etc.) in behalf of
persons themselves incapable of
giving consent for themselves.
Writers speak of proxy consent or
presumptive or vicarious consent,
and there is a unanimity that in
such instances proxy consent is
morally justifiable. Yet we can,
indeed we must, seek to determine why consent can reasonably
be presumed in such instances.
It is critically important in
cases such as these that the presumption of consent in no way
ruptures the canon of loyalty that
ought to exist between the experimenter and the person who is
his co-adventurer in the role of
t he subject of the experiment the canon that is articulated in
the principle of a reasonably free
and adequately informed consent.
This is something stressed by
Ramsey in his perceptive analysis
of the ethics of consent. 13 The
subject is not being depersonalized; the experiment does not reduce him to a thing or to what we
can call an entity of no moral
242

worth, and it does not do so precisely because it is not using him
to benefit others. He is not being
subordinated to the interests of
others or to the good of society
as a whole. The experiment in no
way violates his humanity, his
worth as a being who must be
regarded as a bearer of rights that
simply must be recognized and
respected by the society in which
he lives.
Proxy consent for procedures
that will be of benefit to the subject thus seems to be morally
justifiable on the grounds that
it does not do violence to the
subject of the experiment, that it
respects his humanity, his worth
as a being who differs in kind
from other animals. But is there
more to the justification of proxy
consent than this?
One of the finest ethicists of
our day, the eminent Jesuit Richard A. McCormick, has recently
argued that there is much more to
justifying proxy consent in experiments that will be of benefit
to the subject than simply showing that consent does not do violence to the subject as a human
being,14 and it will be to our purpose to examine his position inasmuch as it will lead us to a
consideration of the possible justification of proxy consent in
purely experimental types of procedures.
According to McCormick, one
of the major reasons why proxy
consent is morally justifiable in
situations wherein the procedures
are intended to be of benefit to
Linacre Quarterly

the health and life of the subject
is that the subject who is incapable of giving consent for himself can reasonably be presumed
to be willing to give consent if
he were capable. He wo uld choose
to subject himself to the experiment because he ought to choose
to do so. And why ought he to
choose to do so? M cCormick,
drawing on the writings of moral
philosophers and theologians like
J . de Finance, G. de Broglie, G.
Grisez, and John Finnis, I ; argues
that he ought to do so because
his own life and health are real
human goods, goods t hat are to
be prized and not simply priced,
goods that demand our respect
and love, goods that we. ought to
pursue both for ourselves and for
others.
The Pluriform Human Good
The matter can be put this
way. All men , simply because
they are men, have an obligation
to pursue the human good, that
is, t he good that perfects or fulfills or completes t hem precisely
because they are men to begin
with. The human good is pluriform, that is, it consists of a set
of real goods constitutive of what
we can call the whole or total
human good, and t hese goods are
real and not merely apparent because they are inherently related
to real needs rooted in our being.
And among these real goods constitutive of the human goods are
life and health. Life and health
are not t he sU11l:mum bonum or
t he highest good, but they are
real components of the total human good . It really is good for
November, 1974

men to be alive and to be healthy,
and consequently all men , just
because they are men, ought to
respect life and health for what
they are : real human goods. They
ought to pursue these goods and
love them, and t hey ought to do
this not because these goods are
some kind of abstractions but because they are real perfections of
human beings and are incarnated
or embodied in real men. To reject them, to despise t hem, to
hate them is to hate one's own
humanity. I" As McCormick puts
it,
a co nstructio n of what the chi ld
wo uld wish (presumed consent) is
not an exe rcise in adult cap ri cious ness and arbitrariness, subj ect to an
equally capricious denial of ch a lle nge wh e n th e child comes of age.
It is based . rather. on two asse rtions: a) that there are ce rta in
va lu es (in this case life itself)
de finitiv e of our good and fl ourishing. h ence values that we ollght to
choose a nd su pport if we want to
become and stay human . and that
th e refore these are good a lso for the
child ; b) tha t these 'ought' judgm ents. at least in their mo re genera l formulation s. a re a common
patronage ava il able to a ll m e n. a nd
he nce form t he bas is on whi ch poli cies can be bui lt.. . I would argue
that pare ntal co nsen t is m orall y
legitimat e where therapy on the
child is involved precisely because
we know that life and h ea lth are
goods for the child , that he lI 'olild
choose them because he ollght to
choose the good of li fe. his ow n selfperservation as long as this life re ma ins. all things conside red. a hu man good. 17

In other words, McCormick
sees t he ultimate reason why it
is morally justifiable for a parent
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or guardian to offer proxy consent for a child or other incompetent subject to undergo therapy
(or diagnosis) to lie in t he reasonableness of the presumption
that the child or other incompetent subject would himself con sent to the experiment in question and would do so because he
ought to do so. McCormick then
goes on to argue that in certain
very restricted situations it would
be morally permissible, morally
justifiable for a parent (or other
competent adult) to give proxy
consent for a child (or other incompetent subject) to participate
in non-therapeutic, non-diagnostic
experiments, that is, in experiments intended of themselves not
to benefit the subject but rather
to benefit others. To support his
position McCormick first stresses
the social solidarity of our existence as moral beings, the corporate framework of our lives. "To
pursue the good that is human
life," McCormick writes,
mea ns n ot only to choose a nd s up port its val ue in on e's own case. bu t
also in the ca se of others wh en t h e
op port unity arises. In other wo rds,
the individual ought also to take
in to account, realize, make efforts
in behalf of the lives of others also.
For we are social beings and t h e
goods that define our growth and
invi te to it are goods that resid e
a lso in others. It can be good for
one to pursue and s upport this good
in others. Therefore , when it fa ctually is good, we may say that on e
ought t o do so (as opposed to not
doing so). If this is true of all of us
up to a point and within limits, it
is no less true of the infant. H e
would choose t o do so because he
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ought to do so. Now, to s upport
and realize the value that is life
m ean s to support and r eali ze h ealth ,
t h e cure of disease and so on.
Therefore, up to a point, this s upport and reali zation is good for all
of us individually. To share in the
ge neral effort and burden of h ealthma intenance and disease-control is
part of OUr flouri shing and growth
as humans. To the extent that it is
good for a ll of us to share this burde n, we a ll ought to do so. And to
th e extent that we ought to do so, it
is a reasonable construction or pres umption of our wish es to say that
we would do so. The r easonableness
of thi s presu mpti on validates vicarious con sent. IS

McCormick thus considers it at
least possible, theoretically, that
a certain level of involvement in
non-therapeutic experimentation
could be good for the child in the
sense that there co uld , in a sense,
be an obligation for the child to
participate in t he experiment. H e
stresses that this obligation is
true only up to a point and within
limits, for he wants to avoid any
kind of position that would do
violence to a subject of an experiment, that would deny his
moral worth and subordinate him
to the interests of others. Bu t he
believes that there are some situations in which one could reasonably presume the consent of the
child or other incompetent t o participate in an experimentation.
He recognizes that in most types
of non-therapeutic, non-diagnostic
experimentations only true consent (that is, consent given by
the subject involved in his own
behalf) can justify the participation inasmuch as it is such a highLinacre Quarterly

ly personal affair and the good
that can be secured by the subject is the good of expressed charity, a good that requires one's
own free choice. Nonetheless he
thinks that it is possible that
there could be situations where
highly personal and individual
considerations are not at stake
and where presumed consent is
reasonable because we could say
of all individuals that they ought
to be willing to participate in an
experimentation because not to
do so would mean a failure to
appreciate properly the meaning
of the human goods of life and
health. McCormick believes that
if a particular experiment would
involve "no discernible risks, no
notable pain, no notable inconvenience, and yet hold promise of
considerable benefit," then one
could justifiably presume the consent of the child (or other incompetent) to participate in the
experiment, and one could reasonably presume this because the
child (or other incompetent)
"ought to want this not because
it is in any way for his own medical good, but because it is not in
any realistic way to his harm and
represents a potentially great
benefit for others." 19
The Use of Human Subjects:
Some Guidelines
We have been led, in following
McCormick's presentation of the
ultimate reasons justifying proxy
consent in diagnostic/ therapeutic
experiments, to take up the question of proxy consent in purely
experimental procedures. McCorNovember, 1974

mick, in common with most ethicists who have written on the
subject and in common with
many medical and legal writers
as well (e.g., Beecher and Curran) ,2o rejects any position that
would justify proxy consent in
purely experimental situations
along a utilitarian or consequentialistic calculus of net benefits to
be achieved. He does not want to
deny the humanity of the subject,
to subordinate him to the interests of others. It is, indeed, for
this reason that McCormick rejects the guidelines set forth in
1973 by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare2 1
regarding the use of human subjects in clinical (i.e., purely experimental) experiments inasmuch as these guidelines justify
using children in experimentations
of no benefit to themselves even
in situations when risks are involved, so long as "the potential
benefit is significant and far outweighs that risk."22 To adopt this
position, McCormick believes, is
to go beyond the boundary of
reasonably presumptive consent.
It is in reality to treat a human
subject as an experimental animal, to deny his personal inviolability and to use him for the
benefit of others. From this we
can see that McCormick, in arguing for the moral justification of
proxy consent in purely experimental situations under certain
very limited conditions, simultaneously opposes any purely
utilitarian or consequentialist calculus.
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The position developed by McCormick must be taken quite seriously. It is attractive at first reading, and it seems quite reasonable. Nonetheless it cim, I believe, be questioned quite strongly, and it is my purpose now to
articulate as well as I can my
objections to his position. Before
setting forth these objections,
however, it will be useful first to
call attention to the position taken by Ramsey with respect to
proxy consent in purely experimental situations. As we proceed
it will become clear that I believe
that Ramsey's position is the
right one to take, although I intend to set forth some reasons
that Ramsey does not for adopting this position.
Ramsey, as we have already
noted, agrees that proxy consent
is morally justifiable in the diagnostic/ therapeutic type of experiment. But he strenuously opposes
proxy consent in the purely experimental type of situation. I;Ie
first argues that it is wrong to
make a child (or other incompetent) a mere object in medical
experimentation for the sake of
good to come. 23 He maintains
further that "no parent is morally
competent to consent that his
child shall be submitted to hazardous or other experiments having no diagnostic or therapeutic
significance for the child himself,"24 and that "morally no parent should consent - or be asked
to consent to any such thing even
if he is quite capable of doing
SO."23 McCormick, of course,
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would agree that it would be
wrong to make a child a mere object in medical experimentation,
and he would also agree that no
parent is morally competent to
consent that his child be submitted to hazardous experiments
having no diagnostic or therapeutic significance for the child
himself. But McCormick, as we
have seen, argues that in experimentations involving no discernible risks or pains or inconveniences to the child (these would
be included under Ramsey's rubric of "or other experiments" in
the citation above) the child is
not necessarily reduced to a mere
object and that it would be morally permissible to presume the
child's consent and to allow the
parent to give proxy consent in
his behalf. But Ramsey has more
to say about the matter, for he
continues:
To attempt to consent for a child
to be made an experimental subject
is to treat a child as not a child. It
is to treat him as if he were an
adult person who has consented to
become a joint adventurer in the
common cause of medical research.
If the grounds for this are alleged
to be the presumptive or implied
consent of the child, that must sim·
ply be characterized as a violent
and a false presumption. Nonthera·
peutic, nondiagnostic experimenta·
tion involving human subjects must
be based on true consent if it is to
proceed as a human enterprise. No
child or adult incompetent can
choose to become a participating
m ember of m edical undertakings,
and no one else on earth should
decide to subject these people to
investigations having no relation to
the ir own treatment. That is a can-
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on of loyalty to them. This they
claim of us simply by being ' a human child or incompetent. When he
is grown, the child may put away
childish things and become a true
volunteer. This is the meaning of
b eing a volunteer: that a man enter and establish a consensual relation in some joint venture for m edical progress. 26

A Matter of Justice?
We are now, I believe, getting
to the heart of the matter. McCormick, of course, is aware of
Ramsey's position here and indeed explicitly refers to this passage in his study. But he argues,
as we have seen, that there can be
instances when participation in an
experimentation is not a matter
of charity, something that is simply impossible without a personal
and free choice made on one's
own behalf, but rather a matter
of justice. He argues, in other
words, that there are instances
when one could reasonably presume that ali men would be willing to participate in an experimentation because they would
realize that they ought to do so.
lt is here that I believe McCormick's analysis must be seriously challenged. And Ramsey, in
an illuminating footnote to the
passage cited above, gives us the
clue that we must follow in challenging McCormick's analysis. In
it he writes as follows:
To base 'Good Samaritan' medical care upon the implied consent
of automobile accident victims is
quite a different matter. A well
child. or a child suffering from an
unrelated disease not being invest.igated. is not to be compared to an
uncooRcious pati e nt needing speci-
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fic treatment. To imply the latter's
'constructive ' consent is not a violent presumption ; it is a life-saving
presumption, though it is in some
degree 'false. '2i

Note that Ramsey says that the
" constructive" consent offered in
behalf of an automobile accident
victim is to some degree "false."
This, I believe, requires reflection, and if we reflect on the matter we can see that in all types of
situations when "proxy consent"
is at stake, that is, when a person
other than the subject of the experiment is authorizing that person's participation in it, the presumption or construction of that
subject's consent is indeed a false
presumption or construction. Consent is a human activity; it is an
act that requires knowledge and
freedom of choice in order to
exist. It is, in other words, a
moral act, and as such it can only
issue from a moral agent. An infant, a child, a person rendered
unconscious in an automobile accident, and all those for whom
"proxy consent" is offered have in
common two supremely important characteristics or features.
These are (1) that they are all
beings of moral worth, that is entities who are the subjects of
rights that transcend the societies
in which they live and that must
be recognized and respected by
their fellow men, and (2) that
they are not moral agents, that is
entities who are the bearers of
moral obligations or duties.
What is the significane of this?
To me it seems that McCormick
in his attempt to provide the ulti247

mate justification for proxy consent in both the therapeutic and
the non-therapeutic or purely experimental situation, does so by
regarding the subject in whose behalf consent is given by another
as a moral agent, as the bearer of
moral obligations. An infant or
child is not, however, a moral
agent. To consider him as if he
were is to consider him for what
he is not.
The ultimate reason justifying
" proxy consent" is not to be
found in any presumed duties or
obligations attributable to the
subject in whose behalf consent is
given. Rather it is to be sought in
the duties or obligations that do,
in truth, relate other members of
the human community to that
subject. A child (or other person
who is not in fact a moral agent)
standing in need of therapy is a
human being who is to be cared
for by others, and he is to be
cared for by others precisely because he is incapable of caring
for himself. His parents (and other members of the human community) are obliged to care for
him. They are to see to it that the
real human goods of which McCormick speaks are protected in
him. He is in peril of losing his
life, or he is already suffering
from loss of his health. He is, in
short, a human being in need. His
parents (or others) are human
beings who are aware of his need
and who are in a position to do
something to meet it. Any moral
obligation that exists is an obligation incumbent on the child's
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parents and others, not incumbent on the child.
To put the matter another way,
I would say that the justification
for "proxy consent" in the diagnostic/ therapeutic situation is
somewhat analogous to the justification ', indeed obligation offered
by John G. Simon, Charles W.
Powers, and Jon P . Gunnemann
for becoming involved in rectifying wrongs done to others by others. These writers develop what
they cal! the "Kew Gardens Principle." If we now describe this
principle and relate the reasoning
behind it to the issue of proxy
consent in the diagonstic/ therapeutic situation, we will, I believe,
see what is at issue. These writers
term their principle the "Kew
Gardens Principle" because of a
famous incident illustrating the
dilemma confronting us when we
see people suffering injustices
that are not caused by us. The
incident to which they refer occurred 8everal years ago in the
Kew Gardens section of the borough of Queens in New York City
when a young woman named Kitty Genovese was attacked and,
after a struggle lasting more than
a half hour, was killed within eyeshot and earshot of more than
thirty people, none of whom wanted to become "involved." According to these authors the Kew
Gardens Principle (which in my
judgment is fully in accord with
the moral position developed by
the authors to whom McCormick
appeals) is relevant in determining when our failure to respond
Linacre Quarterly

to & social injury done b:y others
to another human being or group
of human being becomes morally
culpable. This principle includes
four elements: need, proximity,
capability, and last resort. 28 A
comment on each will help us understand what Simon, Powers,
and Gunnemann mean by this
principle.
Although they note that it is
difficult to give a precise definition of need, by this term they
mean that some human good (life
itself, health, justice) is being destroyed or imperiled in another
human being. A person drowning
in a swimming pool is obviously
a person who is in need - his life
is being threatened. Proximity, of
course, is a spatial image, and
proximity in space is something
relevant in determining our responsibilities in answering needs.
But for the authors of the Kew
Gardens Principle "proximity is
largely a function of notice: we
hold a person blameworthy if he
knows of imperilment and does
not do what he reasonably can
do to remedy the situation ."""
Proximity, in other words, is primarily a matter of being consciously aware of the need other
people have for help ; it is a noetic
proximity. Capability, of course,
refers to the ability of an individual or group of individua ls to
help those who are known to be
in need. "Last resort" is perhaps
the most difficult element of the
Kew Gardens Principle to determine in the type of situations that
our authors have in mind , but
November, 1974

they contend that if the first
three elements of the principle
are verified one must presume
that one is the last resort. >o
Justifying Proxy Consent
Apply this principle to those instan ces when "proxy consent" is
involved in the diagnostic/ therapeutic situation. Here we obviously have human beings in need sick children or other incompetents otherwise suffering ill health
and/ or in danger of death. The
parents of the children are obviously aware of their illness, of
their needs for help, and they are
in a position to do something,
along with the medical profession ,
to meet that need. This, I believe,
is the ultimate reason why we can
justify proxy consen t in diagnostic/ therapeutic situations. There
is a real moral obligation on the
part of parents a nd members of
t he medical profession to come to
the assistance of sick children
a nd others who cannot care for
themselves or even ask for help
or understand what is going on .
It would be irresponsible, immoral for parents and others not
to take effective steps; to assist
t hese helpless human beings, a nd
one of the steps, required because we live in a world where
legal protections are fortunately
available, is for the parents to
authorize the therapeutic work of
the medical community. Their
authori zation is what we term
"proxy consent," and it is' a true
consent on the part of the parents, but it is simply erroneous to
speak meaningfully at all about
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any consent on the part of the
child or infant or other human
being who simply is not a moral
agent.
In the purely experimental type
of experimentation, however, the
child is not in any need. There
can be no moral obligation, even
presumptive, for him to participate in an experimentation, simply because he is not a moral
agent. To think that he is is to
do violence to him and to do violence to reality. It is for this reason that I think the position taken by Ramsey with respect to
"proxy consent" in the purely experimental situation is the proper
one, and not the position developed by McCormick.
Ramsey, however, does maintain that it is morally justifiable
to offer proxy consent for children (and other incompetents) in
some kinds of situations that are
not properly therapeutic or diagnostic. I would include these
among the preventive types of experimentation. What is meant by
this? As Ramsey notes, it is possible for children to be considered
as members of a population that
is subjected to specifiable plagues,
epidemics, diseases, etc. Thus, in
advancing preventive medicine, a
parent can rightfully give proxy
consent for his child to participate in experiments that are primarily experimental and of no
immediate or direct therapeutic
benefit to the child insofar as the
child is at that time not suffering from any disease. Still this
type of experimentation is of possible benefit to him insofar as he
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is a member of a population that
is exposed to a disease that might
at some time affect him. 31
The Cardinal Principle
We can summarize by saying
that the principle of a reasonably
free and adequately informed consent is a cardinal principle in human experimentation of all kinds.
This consent can reasonably, i.e.,
morally, be presumed and given
by one person in behalf of another (proxy consent) if and only
if the experiment is related, either
directly or indirectly, to the wellbeing of the subject himself, and
the ultimate reason why this is
justifiable lies in the obligations
incumbent on parents and others
to care for children and other
human beings who stand in need
of help. Proxy consent is morally
unjustifiable in purely experimental situations, and it is unjustifiable in such cases simply
because it entails a contradiction :
it necessarily requires one to treat
a child or other incompetent individual as a moral agent, something that a child or other incompetent certainly is not.
In purely experimental situations then, what can be called
experimentation, the subject must
himself give consent; no one else
can give it for him. But a reasonably free and adequately informed
consent is not itself sufficient
grounds to justify experimentation. This consent is a necessary
condition to justify the experimentation, but it is not a sufficient condition. There must also
be a proportionate reason for undertaking it. By this I mean that
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the possible hazards to which the
subject is exposed by volunteering to take part in the experiment
must be made reasonable hazards
because of the real goods that the
experiment may secure. It is
somewhat difficult to express
properly what is at stake here.
Negatively it can be expressed by
saying that it is not a matter of
some kind of utilitarian or consequentialist calculus - a weighing of the net balance of good
over evil. Rather it means that
the experimentation itself is "targetted" on the good that will
ensue or that is reasonably expected to ensue, and the intent of
the investigator and his co-adventuring subject is likewise targetted on this good, whereas the
possible harm that may befall the
subject is only indirectly intended or permitted. 32 The point that
I am trying to make may perhaps be seen more clearly if we
compare experimentation to organ transplantation and adopt a
"rule of thumb," advocated by
some doctors who have given serious thought to the latter subject.
For instance, Dr. Jean Hamburger in thinking about the morality of transplants insists that one
is warranted in exposing the donor to danger only if "the risk
to the donor is very much less
than the probability of success to
the recipient.".1.1 Put more generally, we could say that the hazards to which a person who freely
consents to an experiment primarily designed to be of benefit
to persons other than himself
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must be very much less than the
likelihood that the experiment
will indeed advance knowledge
and thereby benefit mankind.
It is also obvious that the experimentation must be well designed scientifically. Not so obvious is that the experimentation
itself ought to involve no moral
evil, no exploitation of persons, no
destruction of human goods in a
direct way. Thus it would be immoral for one to carry out an experiment, even with the consent
of the subjects, that would be immoral in itself. Thus, in my judgment, experiments such as those
conducted by Johnson and Masters in their endeavors to learn
more about human sexuality were
morally wrong.

To conclude, we might take as
our guiding themes in thinking
about human experimentation two
thoughts, one from Beecher the
medical scientist, the other from
Pius XII. For Beecher, an experiment on a human subject does
not become morally right because it succeeds in its purposes;
rather it must be right from the
very beginning. H For Pius XII ,
the moral history of mankind is
more important than its scientific
history. This means that there
may be some things that we can
come to know and that would be
good to know, but that the very
endeavor to gain knowledge. of
them is impossible without doing
something that human beings
ought not to do, either because
they subordinate some human beings to the interests of others or
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require human beings to do deeds
that simply must not be done if
they are to be fully human. 35
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